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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: To investigate whether alert warnings for high-priority and low-priority drug-drug 
interactions (DDIs) were present in five international electronic health record (EHR) systems, to 
compare and contrast the severity level assigned to them, and to establish the proportion of alerts 
that were overridden. 
Methods: We conducted a comparative, retrospective, multinational study using a convenience 
sample of 5 EHRs from the U.S., U.K., Republic of Korea and Belgium.  
Results: Of the 15 previously defined, high-priority, class-based DDIs, alert warnings were 
found to exist for 11 in both the Korean and UK systems, 9 in the Belgian system, and all 15 in 
the two US systems. The specific combinations that were included in these class-based DDIs 
varied considerably in number, type and level of severity amongst systems. Alerts were only 
active for 8.4% (52/619) and 52.4% (111/212) of the specific drug-drug combinations contained 
in the Belgian and UK systems, respectively. Hard stops (not possible to override) existed in the 
US and UK systems only. The override rates for high-priority alerts requiring provider action 
ranged from 56.7 % to 83.3%. Of the 33 previously defined low-priority DDIs, active alerts 
existed only in the US systems, for three class-based DDIs. The majority were non-interruptive. 
Conclusions: Alert warnings existed for most of the high-priority DDIs in the different EHRs but 
overriding them was easy in most of the systems. In addition to validating the high- and low-
priority DDIs, this study reported a lack of standardization in DDI levels across different 
international knowledge bases. 
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Drug–drug interactions (DDIs) occur frequently and pose a threat to patient safety. [1] 
Medication related clinical decision support (CDS) systems have been integrated into electronic 
health record (EHR) systems worldwide and can alert physicians to potentially dangerous DDIs 
during the prescribing process.[2-6] However, CDS systems can also generate alerts with low 
specificity, resulting in high override rates and alert fatigue amongst prescribers.[5] Several 
studies reported alert override rates in excess of 80%, even for those DDIs that have the potential 
to cause severe patient harm.[7-11] 
Tiering of DDI alerts by severity represents one strategy for improving DDI alert 
specificity.[12] Put simply, DDIs can be categorized into groups and presented to prescribers in 
different ways (interruptive or non-interruptive) depending on the group to which they 
belong.[12] In an attempt to guide this process, Phansalkar et al. identified a minimum starter set 
of 15 clinically significant DDIs that should always be categorized as ‘high severity’ and 
generate warnings in all EHRs.[13] Phansalkar et al. also identified ‘low-priority’ DDIs, 33 of 
which did not warrant interruptive alerting.[14] These lists have served as a good starting point 
for tiering alerts in EHR systems, although they represent extremes. The implementation of the 
high priority DDIs list was recently investigated by McEvoy and colleagues in EHRs across the 
United States but this has not been evaluated internationally.[15] The implementation of the low-
priority DDI list has also not been evaluated. To provide insight in DDI alerting practices in 
different countries,  we investigated whether alert warnings for the 15 high-priority and 33 low-
priority DDIs existed in five different international EHRs, compared and contrasted the severity 
level assigned to them, and establish the proportion of overridden alerts. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Design 
We conducted a comparative, retrospective, multinational study in four countries: U.S., 
U.K., Republic of Korea and Belgium. Alert warnings and DDI knowledge base content for the 
15 high-priority [13] and 33 low-priority DDIs [14] were compared between different EHR 
systems implemented at Partners Healthcare (Boston, USA), University Hospitals Birmingham 
NHS Foundation Trust (Birmingham, UK), Universitair Ziekenhuis Brussel (Brussels, Belgium), 
and Asan Medical Center (Seoul, Korea). All five EHRs were built in-house and used medication 
knowledge bases that were created in-house with the exception of the Belgian EHR. Alert data 
were downloaded from each of the four international study sites between 1st January 2009 and 
31st December 2011, with two exceptions. Although data from the Partners Healthcare outpatient 
system was available for the requested time period, data from the inpatient system was only 
available from 1st January 2012 to 31st December 2012 (after tiered alerting was implemented). 
Data from the Asan Medical Center was limited to three consecutive months from 1st February 
2012 to 31st April 2012. 
 
Description of EHRs at International Study Sites 
Partners HealthCare, U.S. 
Partners HealthCare is a regional integrated healthcare delivery system located in the North East 
of the U.S. Prior to 2015, physicians working in the ambulatory setting used a self-developed, 
Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology (CCHIT)-approved, EHR 
system called the Longitudinal Medical Record (LMR). For over 20 years (1984-2015), 
physicians working at the 777-bed, Brigham and Women’s teaching hospital used the Brigham 
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Integrated Computing System (BICS) to place all medication and laboratory orders. BICS 
provided a range of different types of CDS alerts, including DDIs that were tiered: Level 1 alerts 
were hard stops (not possible to override), level 2 alerts were interruptive and required provider 
action (possible to override), and level 3 alerts were non-interruptive (information only). 
 
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust, U.K. 
The University Hospital Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust (UHBFT) is a large acute NHS 
teaching hospital in the UK. It has approximately 1,200 inpatient beds and provides care to 
patients across a range of medical and surgical specialties, with the exception of pediatrics, 
obstetrics and mental health. Since 2004, UHBFT used a locally developed system called PICS 
(Prescribing, Information and Communication System) for the prescribing and administration of 
all inpatient and discharge prescriptions, with the exception of some anti-cancer treatments. PICS 
presented CDS alerts in one of three ways: (1) hard stop that prevents an action within the system 
(Level 1); (2) override alert requiring a password to continue (Level 2); (3) system warning or 
information requiring an acknowledgment to continue (Level 3).   
 
UZ Brussel, Belgium 
The UZ Brussel is a 721-bed university hospital in Brussels, Belgium. The hospital system 
includes CDS functionality for drug prescribing, with a user interface that was developed in-
house.[16-19] DDI screening was gradually implemented across all hospital departments in 2009. 
During the study period, only interruptive DDI alerts were triggered at the point of prescribing. 
These alerts did not require the healthcare provider to give an override reason in order to continue 
but did require the order to be reconfirmed before sending it to pharmacy. The commercially 
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available DelphiCare® knowledge base supported DDI checking, with DDIs categorized in to six 
levels depending on their severity and likelihood of occurrence (Table 1).[4, 20]  
 
Table 1: Severity and likelihood of occurrence classification in DelphiCare® 
DelphiCare® Severity classification prior to October 2013 [20] 
1 Contraindicated 
2 Precautionary contraindicated 
3 Monitoring or therapy adjustment needed 
4 In some cases monitoring or therapy adjustment is needed 
5 Precautionary monitoring 
6 No action needed 
DelphiCare®  Likelihood of occurrence classification [20] 
Reported Evidence for occurrence is reported in the literature 
Expected It may be expected that the interaction will occur 
Not known Not possible to make a statement  
Unlikely It is unlikely that the interaction will occur 
 
The system was set up to trigger interruptive alerts only for DDIs that were considered 
contraindicated (Level 1) or precautionary contraindicated (Level 2). These alerts were displayed 
in the same way to the user with the respective level indicated.[4] DelphiCare® also assigned a 
‘likelihood of occurrence’ level to the DDIs (reported, expected, not known, unlikely) as shown 
in Table 1. During the study period, the CDS system at UZ Brussels was only set up to trigger 
alerts for those DDIs classified as ‘Reported’. However, for the purposes of this study, we 
downloaded data on all DDI alerts that had either a ‘Reported’ or ‘Expected’ likelihood of 
occurrence level across all severity levels. 
 
Asan Medical Center, South Korea 
The Asan Medical Center is a tertiary teaching hospital with 2,000 beds located in Seoul, South 
Korea. It has home-grown EHR system, which is used throughout the hospital by all physicians 
working in both inpatient and outpatient departments. The hospital introduced interruptive DDI 
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alerts in 2012 at the same time as other types of alerts e.g., drug allergy, duplication, pregnancy 
contraindication, and drug formulary. These DDI rules consisted of 476 drug pairs, comprising of 
77 drug classes and 238 drugs. They were developed nationally based on the product labeling 
information provided by the Korea Food and Drug Administration, and their implementation 
enforced by the Health Insurance Review Agency (HIRA) in all ambulatory and outpatient 
settings throughout the country.  
 
Data collection 
Data were downloaded from the alert log database in each of the five international systems and 
patient identifiers removed. The necessary approvals were obtained from each organizations’ 
respective ethics committee or institutional review boards e.g., UZ Brussel Medical Ethics 
Committee (Belgium), Partners Human Research Committee (US),  
UHBFT Research and Development Department (UK), and Asan Medical Center Institutional 
Review Board (Korea). 
 
Statistical analysis 
Descriptive analyses were used to summarize the types and number of DDI alerts, the override 
rates, and the number of prescriptions with a DDI. Descriptive analyses were carried out with 
Microsoft® Excel® 2010 (Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA). 
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RESULTS 
High-priority, class-based DDIs 
 
(1) What ‘high-priority’ class-based DDI alert warnings existed in each of the five 
international systems and what severity levels were assigned to them? 
 
Of 15 previously defined, high-priority, class-based DDIs,[13] alert warnings were found to exist 
for all in the two US systems, 11 in both the Korean and the UK systems, and 9 in the Belgian 
system. The ramelteon and CYP1A2 inhibitors interaction was not included in the UK and 
Korean systems. The Korean system also did not have alert warnings for neither the febuxostat 
and azathioprine/mercaptopurine, nor the strong CYP3A4 inducers and protease inhibitors class-
based DDIs (e.g. Rifampin-Atazanavir). In the UK system, the irinotecan and strong CYP3A4 
inhibitors interaction, and the tizanidine and strong CYP1A2 inhibitors interaction were not 
included. The tranylcypromine and procarbazine interaction was only included in the two US 
systems. 
 
The severity level assigned to the class-based DDIs varied extensively between international 
systems (Table 2). Hard stops existed for 11 class-based DDIs in the US inpatient system, 12 
class-based DDIs in the US outpatient system, and 5 class-based DDIs in the UK system. There 
were no hard stops in the Belgian or Korean systems. Interruptive alerts requiring provider action 
(possible to override) existed for 11 class-based DDIs in the Korean system, 10 class-based DDIs 
in the US systems, 9 class-based DDIs in the Belgian system and 8 class-based DDIs in the UK 
system. 
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Table 2: Overview of the 15 ‘high-priority’ class-based DDIs and the assigned severity levels in each of the different international 
EHR systems  
Object class name Precipitant class name UZ Brussela, b 
(Level 1 to 6) 
US BICS 
inpatientb, c 
(Level 1 to 3) 
US LMR 
outpatient 
(Level 1 to 3)b 
AMS Koreac 
(Level 2 only) 
PICS, UK (Level 1 to 
3)b 
Amphetamine and Derivatives MAO inhibitors 1a 1 & 2 1 & 2 2 2 
Atazanavir  Proton pump inhibitors 2a 2 1 & 2 2 1 
Febuxostat Azathioprine /mercaptopurine 3 1 1 n/a 2 
SSRIs MAO inhibitors 1a 2 1 & 2 2 1 & 2 
Irinotecan Strong CYP3A4 inhibitors 3 & 5 1 1 2 n/a 
Narcotic analgesics MAO inhibitors 2a 1 & 2 2 2 2 
Tricyclic antidepressants MAO inhibitors 3 1 1 2 2 
QT prolonging agents QT prolonging agents 1a, 2a, 3 & 5 1,2 &3 1, 2 & 3 2 1, 2 & 3 
Ramelteon CYP1A2 inhibitors 2 & 3 1 1 n/a n/a 
Strong CYP3A4 inducers Protease inhibitors 1a, 2a, 3 & 5 2 & 3 2 & 3 n/a 2 
HMG Co-A reductase 
inhibitors 
CYP3A4 inhibitors 
1a & 3 1,2&3 1, 2 & 3 2 1 & 2 
CYP3A4 inhibitors Ergot alkaloids and derivates 1a & 2 2 2 2 1 
Tizanidine CYP1A2 inhibitors 1a & 3 1,2,&3 1, 2 & 3 2 n/a 
Tranylcypromine Procarbazine n/a 1 1 n/a n/a 
Triptans MAO inhibitors 2 1 & 2 1 & 2 2 1 
a Alert warnings were included in the Belgian database for 14 class-based alerts but the system was activated for only 9 class-based alerts. 
b The level of decision support varied according to the drug selected in a class. 
c Data from 2012 for the US Inpatient system, from February 1 to April 31 for the Korean system and from 2009 till 2011 for all other systems. 
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(2) How many individual drug-drug combinations were included in these ‘high-priority’ class-based 
DDIs and how did their severity level vary both within and between different systems? 
 
There were 742 individual drug-drug combinations included in the 15 class-based DDIs listed in the 
original high-priority DDI paper.[13] Of these, 619 (83.4%) were included in the Belgian system, 462 
(62.3%) in the BICS system, 441 (59.4%) in the LMR system, 212 (28.6%) in the UK system and 53 
(7.1%) in the Korean system. For the US and Korean systems, alerts were active for all individual drug-
drug combinations. However, in the Belgian and UK systems, alerts were only active for 8.4% (52/619) 
and 52.4% (111/212) of the specific drug-drug combinations, respectively (Table 4). The specific drug-
drug combinations that were included in the class-based interactions also varied considerably both in the 
type and severity level between the different EHRs. For example, of the 23 strong CYP3A4 inhibitors 
that could interact with irinotecan, only five (aprepitant, fluconazole, itraconazole, ketoconazole and 
voriconazole) were included in the Belgian system, one (ketoconazole) in both US systems, one 
(atazanavir) in the Korean system, and none in the UK system. Furthermore, the individual drug-drug 
combination quinidine and methadone in the class-based DDI of QT prolonging agents & QT prolonging 
agents was assigned a severity level 1 (contraindicated) in the Belgian system, whereas quinidine and 
chloroquine in the same class-based DDI was assigned a level 5 (patient follow up) in the same system. 
These combinations were both assigned a severity level 2 in the US systems and were not included in the 
Korean and UK systems (Table 3). Finally, the severity level also changed for some of these specific 
drug-drug combinations during the study period e.g., the simvastatin and CYP3A4 inhibitors 
combinations (ketoconazole) level changed from a level 3 (2009 – 2010) to a level 2 (2010 – 2011) and 
finally to a level 1 (2011 - onwards) in the US outpatient system. 
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Table 3: Examples of individual drug-drug combinations that varied across three or more levels in the 
five international EHR systems 
DDI pair 
UZ Brussela 
(Level 1 to 6) 
US BICS 
inpatient 
(Level 1 to 3) 
US LMR 
outpatient 
(Level 1 to 3) 
AMS Koreab 
(Level 2 only) 
PICS, UK 
(Level 1 to 3) 
#6. Febuxostat-azathioprine/ 
Mercaptopurine 
3 1 1 Not included 2 
#20. Tricyclic antidepressants- 
MAO inhibitors 
3 1 1 2 2 
Amitriptyline-Selegiline 3 1 1 2 2 
Doxepin-Phenelzine 3 Not included Not included Not included 2 
Dosulepin-Procarbazine 3 Not included Not included Not included 2 
#21. QT prolonging agents-QT 
prolonging agents 
1, 2, 3 & 5 1, 2 & 3 1, 2 & 3 2 Variable 
Quinidine-Methadone 1 2 2 Not included Not included 
Amiodarone-Chloroquine 5 2 2 Not included 1 
Disopyramide-
Chlorpromazine 
2 3 3 Not included 2 
Quinidine-Chloroquine 5 2 2 Not included Not included 
#23. Strong CYP3A4 inducers - 
Protease inhibitors 
1, 2, 3 & 5 2 & 3 2 & 3 Not included 2 
Bosentan-Ritonavir 5 2 2 Not included 2 
Rifampin-Atazanavir 1 3 3 Not included 2 
Rifabutin-Indinavir 3 3 3 Not included 2 
#25. HMG Co-A reductase 
inhibitors- CYP3A4 inhibitors 
1 & 3 1, 2 & 3 1, 2 & 3 2 Variable 
Lovastatin-Erythromycin 1 1 & 3a 3 2 Not included 
Simvastatin-Ketoconazole 1 1 1, 2 & 3a 2 Not included 
Simvastatin-Itraconazole 1 1 2 & 3a 2 2 
Simvastatin-Clarithromycin 1 1 1, 2 & 3a 2 Not included 
Simvastatin-Ritonavir 3 1 1 & 2a 2 1 
a The alert level for the specific drug-drug combination changed during the study period 
 
(3) How many ‘high-priority’ DDI alert warnings were triggered to users of each of the different 
international EHR systems and how often were these overridden?   
 
During the study period, 76 (1.8%) hard stop alerts were generated in the US inpatient system, 768 
(4.4%) in the US outpatient system, and 20 (52.6%) in the UK system. There were no hard stop alerts 
displayed in the Belgian and Korean systems, but the number of interruptive alerts generated that 
required provider action was 215 (100%) and 43 (100%) in the Belgian and Korean systems, 
respectively. The override rate for the interruptive alerts was lower in the US outpatient system (56.7%) 
than in all other systems (74.9 – 83.3%, Table 4). The high override rates were concentrated in a few 
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class-based DDIs. In the Belgian, US inpatient, US outpatient and Korean system respectively 93.2%, 
70.9%, 96.2% and 81.8% of the overridden alerts were part of the HMG Co-A reductase inhibitors and 
CYP3A4 inhibitors interaction. Additionally, 28.9% and 3.4% of the overrides in the US inpatient and 
outpatient system respectively were located in the QT prolonging agents & QT prolonging agents 
interaction. In the UK system, 73.3% of the overridden alerts were part of the narcotic analgesics and 
MAO inhibitors interaction. 
 
Table 4: An overview of the interruptive/non-interruptive nature of the high priority class-based DDIs 
and the total number of alerts triggered in the five international EHRs  
 UZ Brussel US BICS 
Inpatientc 
US LMR 
Outpatient 
AMS 
Koreac 
 
PICS, UK  
Class-based alerts included 9 (14a) 15 15 11 11 
Interruptive 
alerts (class-
based) 
Hard stops - 11b 12b - 5b 
Provider action 
required 
9 10b 10b 11 8b 
Non-interruptive/informational 
alerts (class-based) 
- 4b 4b - - 
Individual combinations 
included 
52 (619a) 462 441 53 111 (212d) 
Interruptive 
alerts 
Hard stops - 89 92 - 38 
Provider action 
required 
52 304 267 53 73 
Non-interruptive/informational 
alerts 
- 69 82 - - 
Total alerts fired 215 (3648a) 4302 17489 43 38 
Interruptive 
alerts 
Hard stops - 76 768 - 20 
Provider action 
required 
215 3740 6873 43 18 
Override rate (%) 74.9% 80.2% 56.7% 76.7% 83.3% 
Total non-interruptive alerts fired - 486 9848 - - 
a Alert warnings were included in the database for 14 class-based alerts (619 combinations) but the system was 
activated for only 9 class-based alerts (52 combinations). Only 215 alerts were generated while 3,648 could have 
been triggered. 
b Different classification levels were assigned to specific combinations within the same class-based interaction or 
levels changed during study period 
c Data from 2012 for the US Inpatient system, from February 1 to April 31 for the Korean system and from 2009 
till 2011 for all other systems 
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Non-interruptive/informational alerts existed only in the US systems for 4 class-based DDIs and 
accounted for 11.3%, and 56.3% of the alerts displayed in the US inpatient and US outpatient systems, 
respectively.  
 
Low-priority, class-based DDIs 
 
4) What ‘low-priority’ class-based DDI alert warnings existed in each of the five international 
systems and what severity levels were assigned to them? 
 
The UK and Korean system alerted on none of the 33 low-priority class-based DDIs that could safely 
remain ‘non-interruptive’ in the original list.[14] The Belgian system included 24 low-priority class-
based DDIs in the database but alerts were not active for any of these (53,437 alerts could have been 
triggered). Most of these class-based DDIs were assigned level 5 (precautionary monitoring), although 
there were eight assigned a severity level of 3 (monitoring or therapy adjustment needed), and one 
assigned a severity level of 2 (precautionary contraindicated). Three low-priority, class-based DDIs were 
included in the US systems and assigned a severity Level 2 or 3 (e.g., niacin and statins; proton pump 
inhibitors and imidazoles; anticoagulants and statins). Table 5 provides an overview of the 33 low-
priority class-based DDIs and the level of severity assigned to them in the Belgian and US systems. 
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Table 5: Overview of 33 low-priority class-based DDIs and level of severity of alerts in the Belgian and US systems. 
Object class name Precipitant class name Level 
Belg. 
Nr. of 
prescr. Belg. 
Alerts 
Belg.a 
Level US 
inpatientb 
Alerts US 
inpatient 
Level US 
outpatient 
Alerts US 
outpatient 
ACE inhibitors Salicylates 4 750 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Niacin Statins 5 0 n/a 2 & 3 29 (2) 
447 (3) 
2 & 3 215 (2) 
9683 (3) 
β-adrenergic blockers Serotonin reuptake blockers 2 & 5 335 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Iron salts Proton pump inhibitors n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Thiazide-type diuretics ACE inhibitors 5 3361 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Thyroid hormones Calcium salts 3 942 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Thyroid hormones Statins n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Thiazide-type diuretics NSAIDS 4 1642 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
β-adrenergic blockers Thyroid hormones n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Macrolide 
immunosuppressives  
Corticosteroids 5 1280 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Antacids Corticosteroids (oral) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Bisphosphonates Calcium salts 3 700 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Vitamin B12 Omeprazole n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Folic Acid Methotrexate n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Sulfonylureas ACE inhibitors 5 1271 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Iron salts Thyroid hormones 3 350 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Anticoagulants Corticosteroids 5 1662 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Anticoagulants Acetaminophen 4 8833 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Antacids Iron salts (oral) 3 135 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Anticoagulants Proton pump inhibitors 5 5396 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Proton pump inhibitors Imidazoles 3 169 n/a 2 & 3 9 (2) 
470 (3) 
2 & 3 22 (2) 
387 (3) 
β-Adrenergic blockers Calcium salts (oral) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
ACE inhibitors Angiotensin II receptor 
antagonists 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Anticoagulants Statins 5 4431 n/a 3 7359 3 12595 
Omeprazole Benzodiazepines 5 4673 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Anticoagulants Vitamin E 5 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Zinc salts (oral)  Quinolones (oral) 3 48 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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NSAIDS β-Adrenergic blockers 3 & 4 5010 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Clopidogrel Salicylates 3 496 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Oral contraceptives Corticosteroids 5 62 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
β-Adrenergic blockers Nifedipine and derivatives 5 8296 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Corticosteroids/corticotropin Anticholinesterases n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
ACE inhibitors NSAIDS 4 3595 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
a Alert warnings were included in the Belgian database for 15 class-based alerts but the system was activated for none of the class-based alerts. 
b Data from 2012 for the US Inpatient system, from 2009 till 2011 for all other systems. 
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4) How many individual drug-drug combinations were included in these 33 ‘low-priority’ class-
based DDIs and how did their severity level vary both within and between different systems? 
 
There were 3,792 individual drug-drug combinations included in the 33 low-priority, class-based DDIs 
listed in the original paper.[2] Of these, 2,479 (65.4%) were included in the Belgian system, 19 (0.5%) in 
both the BICS and LMR systems, and none in the UK and Korean system. Most combinations that were 
included in the BICS and LMR system were also included in the Belgian system, except for the 
individual drug-drug combination ‘niacin and fluvastatin’ from the class-based DDI (niacin – statins) 
and ‘omeprazole and voriconazole’ from the class-based DDI (proton pump inhibitors – imidazoles).  
 
5) How many ‘low-priority’ DDI alert warnings were triggered to users of each of the different 
international EHR systems and how often were these overridden? 
 
The US inpatient and outpatient systems generated 38 and 237 interruptive alerts (requiring provider 
action) for the Level 2 class-based DDIs ‘niacin and statins’ and ‘proton pump inhibitors and 
imidazoles’, respectively. These interruptive alerts accounted for 0.5% of the alerts in the US inpatient 
system and 1.0% of the alerts in the US outpatient system. Both U.S. systems generated a total of 8,276 
(inpatient) and 22,665 (outpatient) Level 3 information-only alerts, which accounted for 99.5%, and 
99.0% of the alerts fired in the US inpatient and US outpatient systems, respectively. The override rate 
for the interruptive alerts requiring provider action was higher for the US inpatient system: 57.9% and 
66.7 % for the US inpatient and US outpatient system, respectively. A summary of the low-priority alert 
results is provided in table 6. 
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Table 6: An overview of the interruptive/non-interruptive nature of the low priority class-based DDIs 
and the total number of alerts triggered in the Belgian and US systems.  
 
 Belgium US Inpatientb US Outpatient 
Class-based alerts included 0 (24a) 3c 3c 
Interruptive 
class-based 
alerts 
Hard stops - 0 0 
Provider action 
required 
- 2c 2c 
Non-interruptive/informational class-
based alerts 
- 3c 3c 
Individual combinations included (2,479a) 19 19 
Interruptive 
alerts 
Hard stops - 0 0 
Provider action 
required 
- 11 11 
Non-interruptive/informational alerts - 8 8 
Total alerts fired 0 (53,437a) 8,314 22,902 
Interruptive 
alerts 
Hard stops - 0 0 
Provider action 
required  
- 
 
38 237 
 
Override rate (%) - 57.9% 66.7% 
non-interruptive alerts fired  - 8,276 22,665 
a Alert warnings were included in the database for 24 class-based alerts (2,479 combinations) but alerts were not 
active for any of these (53,437 alerts could have been triggered) 
b Data from 2012 for the US Inpatient system, from 2009 till 2011 for all other systems 
c In the US inpatient and outpatient systems, class-based interactions could have several severity levels because 
individual drug pairs were assigned different severity levels.  
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DISCUSSION 
We investigated whether alert warnings for the previously defined, 15 high-priority and 33 low-
priority class-based DDIs were present in five international EHRs. We found that the high-priority alerts 
were mostly present, but overriding them was too easy in most of the systems, which represents an 
important patient safety issue. The tranylcypromine and procarbazine interaction was only included in 
both US systems. This particular interaction can result in a possible fatal hypertensive crisis in 
patients.[21] In Belgium, tranylcypromine and procarbazine are currently not/no longer available on the 
market, but alerts for specific drug-drug interactions containing these drugs (e.g., tranylcypromine and 
linezolid) were still activated in case they were imported from abroad. Tranylcypromine and tizanidine 
are not recommended treatments at UHBFT and as such were not available to be prescribed in PICS. 
Similarly, ramelteon and irinotecan were not available to be prescribed in PICS because ramelteon is not 
licensed in the UK, and irinotecan and other anti-cancer therapies were are largely still prescribed on 
paper. As a consequence, DDI alerts involving these drugs were not included in the UK system. The 
Korean system did not alert for the high-priority class-based DDI, strong CYP3A4 inducers and protease 
inhibitors, which can lead to severe hepatocellular toxicity and sub-therapeutic serum concentrations of 
protease inhibitors.[21, 22] The alert was triggered in both the US outpatient and UK system and the 
combination was also prescribed in the Belgian system.  
There was huge variation in the number of individual drug-drug combinations included within 
the high-priority class-based interactions of different EHRs. McEvoy et al. also reported a lack of 
standardization in high-priority DDI levels across 14 different vendor-based EHRs in the US.[15] Our 
study reported a similar lack of standardization in DDI levels in EHRs in different countries and in in-
house created knowledge bases. The characteristics of the databases supporting the CDS played a very 
important role. The Belgian system used the commercially available DelphiCare® knowledge base 
which is very comprehensive while the Korean system was supported by a smaller national database. 
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However, in the Belgian system, many alerts were not active which was a decision taken by the 
institution. Institutional decisions seem to be as important as database limitations in influencing which 
alerts were triggered. The clinical relevance of DDIs did not appear to be standardized across institutions 
perhaps due, in part, to the supporting evidence often being theoretical or limited to case reports. A 
framework for the standardized evaluation of the clinical relevance of DDIs may be required. The 
absence of hard stops in the Belgian system could be explained by the reluctance in this specific 
institution to include hard stops. 
We also evaluated the implementation and alerting of the low-priority DDI list. The low-priority 
alerts were not present in most EHRs. The US inpatient and outpatient systems were the only systems 
that had alerts for three of the 33 low-priority class-based DDIs. Although there was only a small 
number of interruptive alerts generated, these alerts could still be safely made non-interruptive to reduce 
the alert burden.[14] The absence of any alerts for the other DDIs may involve a safety risk. Completely 
turning off the low-priority alerts is not recommended. Prescribers should have access to non-
interruptive alerts or on-demand information regarding these low-priority DDIs. 
Finding the right balance between over- and under-alerting is essential to avoid alert fatigue. 
Similar to McEvoy et al., we believe that institutions should carefully review their DDI alerting 
approaches.[15] This process should be iterative; implementation of CDS should not be considered a 
‘one and done’ step but a continuous process improvement. A review may be required following updates 
in the evidence supporting specific DDIs, but also based on an evaluation of alert overrides and override 
reasons. Sharing DDI information between institutions could also help in understanding the broader 
perspective of alerting approaches and make the knowledge management process less burdensome and 
more informed. 
Future research should evaluate strategies to improve the clinical relevance of alerts including 
context-aware alerting (based on individual patient data), using DDI specific screening intervals (time 
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between the administrations of two drugs for which an alert is triggered) and applying human factor 
principles. [4, 23-26]  
We have acknowledged that not all institutions in our study could provide alert data for the 
initially defined time period and so we have only provided relative descriptive comparisons. We used a 
convenience sample of five EHRs and generalizability of the results may be limited to academic medical 
centers with in-house created knowledge bases. The comparison was limited to the previously published 
high-priority and low-priority DDI list which is not an official standard. Additionally, it is possible that 
the research that contributed to the high priority paper helped influence the DDI alert implementations in 
the Boston inpatient and outpatient setting. This could have led to the US hospitals having a greater 
concordance with the cited alerts than the other international institutions. However, we also evaluated 
changes in DDI severity classification during the study period and only a few DDIs changes were observed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Alert warnings were found to be present in the different EHRs for the majority of the high-
priority DDIs but only for a few low-priority DDIs. However, some very important warnings were 
overridden in some systems.  All systems should include some hard stops, though they should be using 
sparingly.  The specific combinations that were included and the severity level assigned often varied 
substantially. A framework for the standardized evaluation of the clinical relevance of DDIs is required. 
Institutions should also review their DDI alerting strategy, especially after the publication of updated 
evidence, and share DDI alerting information between institutions to promote learning. Future research 
should focus on achieving the right balance between over- and under-alerting. 
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